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Preparation of Terrorist Acts, Section 
5 Terrorism Act 2006: Evidence  
Required and Sentencing Guidelines
Drafted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 
London, July 2005 the Terrorism Act 2006 was in-
troduced that included an important section regard-
ing the preparation of terrorist acts. Section 5 of the 
Act states:  
(1) A person commits an offence if, with the intention 
of: 
(a) committing acts of terrorism, or 
(b) assisting another to commit such acts, he engages 
in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to his 
intention.  
(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) 
whether the intention and preparations relate to 
one or more particular acts of terrorism, acts of          
terrorism of a particular description or acts of           
terrorism generally.  
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section 
shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to im-
prisonment for life. 
 
As the Court of Appeal observed in Iqbal and Iqbal 
[2010] EWCA Crim 3215, section 5 was enacted to 
extend the ambit of criminal law in the context of 
complicated acts of terrorism. As with most terrorism 
legislation enacted at Westminster, it applies to the 
whole of the UK not just England and Wales. Where 
necessary, under section 26 of the 2006 Act it makes 
separate provisions for search powers for Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. An important aspect of sec-
tion 5 is that where investigators gather evidence re-
vealing a person may still be in a preparatory stage, it 
allows them to consider arresting a suspect at an early 
stage thereby assisting with the primary aim of 
counter-terrorism investigations, preventing a ter-
rorist attack from occurring.  
 
Terrorist Causes, Intent and Aggravating Factors 
Two important issues related to the section 5 offence 
have been covered in subsequent court decisions. 
One related to the terrorists’ cause where in R v C and 
R [2016] EWCA Crim 61 the Court of Appeal held 
that Parliament legislated against all forms of terror-
ism and does not distinguish between causes or aims. 
The Court said to do so would be to introduce a new 
element into the offence. Developing this view in C 
and R, in R v Mohammad Abdul Kahar and others 
[2016] EWCA568 the Court of Appeal held that to 
distinguish between causes would be: 
‘…invidious in dealing with law enforcement        
agencies and parties here [in the UK] and abroad, to 
publicly rank terrorist organisations or causes.’ 
 
Due to section 5 carrying a sentence of life imprison-
ment, a second issue was in relation to the sentencing 
guidelines. While this is important for the judiciary, 
especially trial judges, this issue also impacts on those 
investigating terrorist activities, particularly in rela-
tion to evidence gathering. In Kahar the Court of        
Appeal held there are two categories of factors to con-
sider. The first category focuses mainly on the mens 
rea that covers:  
1. Preparation of terrorist acts intended to take place 
wholly or mainly in the UK;  
2. Acts of terrorism intended to take place abroad in-
cludes those who reach the intended country, those 
engaged in the preparation of travel, but who do not 
reach the intended country;  
3. Those who provide assistance to others intending 
to travel with the required intention. 
 
The second category focuses on aggravating factors 
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that are mainly the actus reus elements of the offence 
that include:  
1. The degree of planning, complexity and sophisti-
cation involved together with the extent of the of-
fender’s commitment to carry out the acts of 
terrorism;  
2. Period of time involved; 
 
3. Depth and extent of the radicalisation of the             
offender (a significant feature when considering 
dangerousness), for example, possession of extrem-
ist material and/or communication of such views to 
others;  
4. The extent to which the offender has been re-
sponsible for indoctrinating or attempting to indoc-
trinate others and the vulnerability of the target of the 
indoctrination. 
 
Section 5 Trial Cases’ Application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines  
Examining a couple of section 5 case trials illustrate 
how the courts apply the intent and the aggravating 
factors when sentencing defendants. In R v Safiyya 
Amura Shaikh, (2020) 3rd July 2020, Shaikh, a Muslim 
convert, was a supporter of the group Islamic State 
(IS) who pleaded guilty to the section 5 offence of 
planning to blow herself up in an improvised explo-
sive device (IED) attack at St. Paul’s Cathedral in Lon-
don, in 2019. Shaikh was considered such a threat 
that the UK’s Security Service (MI5) made her the 
highest-level priority for investigation resulting in her 
being subject to a level of surveillance for only the 
most dangerous potentials attackers.  
In sentencing Shaikh, the trial judge, Mr Justice 
Sweeney, considered the intent, aggravating and mit-
igating factors. In relation to the aggravating factors, 
Shaikh stayed at a hotel in the City of London close to 
St. Paul’s Cathedral where she conducted surveillance 
of St. Paul’s that included her taking photographs 
and video footage of the Cathedral layout and secu-
rity arrangements. As confirmed from the evidence 
of undercover officers, who were part of the investi-
gation into Shaikh, whom she befriended, Shaikh 
stated she intended to plant an IED under St. Paul’s 
dome, the hotel she stayed in and detonate a suicide 
IED vest intending to kill as many people as possible. 
During the time she was making the preparations 
Shaikh posted a video on the social media site, Green-
birds, where #Greenbirds involves social media in-
fluencers on Twitter supporting IS, and a video on 
making a suicide IED vest. She also posted videos on 
various social media sites, including encrypted sites 
like Telegram, promoting IS’ attacks in the West with 
the aim of encouraging others to do the same. Among 
the aggravating factors that Mr Justice Sweeney            
referred to in sentencing Shaikh included:  
1. Recent and repeated possession or accessing                 
extremist material;  
2. Communication with other extremists;  
3. Use of encrypted communications; and  
4. Encouraging others. 
 
Mr Justice Sweeney found sufficient mens rea for a sec-
tion 5 offence was present as Shaikh planned to det-
onate IED’s in St. Paul’s Cathedral and the hotel she 
stayed at. The aggravating factors from her intention 
revealed the degree of planning, complexity and ex-
tent of Shaikh’s commitment to carry out the terror-
ist act. In relation to the possession and use of 
communications, Shaikh demonstrated the depth 
and extent of her radicalisation to IS’ cause. By using 
various forms of communication to encourage others 
to commit acts of terrorism reveals the extent Shaikh 
was responsible for indoctrinating or attempting to 
indoctrinate others to IS’ cause. 
 
Mitigating factors were considered by Mr Justice 
Sweeney that included Shaikh having doubts about 
carrying out the attack but did not know how to stop 
(revealed to the police during her suspect interview 
while in police detention following her arrest). Also, 
Shaikh declared she was ‘not well in [her] head’, as a 
result a psychiatric report was forwarded to the court 
on her behalf. Along with her guilty plea, her mental 
health and vulnerability were also taken into account 
as mitigating factors, resulting in a reduction of a 
third of her sentence. Overall, Mr Justice Sweeney 
saw the aggravating factors significantly outweighing 
the mitigating factors, which along with the Pre-Sen-
tence report was sufficient for it to be self-evident that 
Shaikh was a dangerous offender. She was sentenced 
to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 14 
years’ imprisonment. 
 
In R v Renshaw (2019) 17th May 2019, Jack Renshaw, 
a neo-Nazi, had been photographed and video 
recorded on numerous occasions speaking at the ex-
treme far-right group, National Action’s public as-
semblies held prior to the group’s proscription as a 
terrorist organisation. (Strangely he was found by not 
guilty of being a member of a proscribed organisa-
tion.) Renshaw pleaded guilty to a section 5 offence of 
preparing an act of terrorism where he intended to 
kill the MP Rosie Cooper and the police officer who 
previously investigated him for his involvement re-
lated to a sexual offence. The threat was so severe that 
Rosie Cooper’s friends and family encouraged her to 
stand down from Parliament, but she refused saying 
she did not want ‘tyranny to prevail’. During Ren-
shaw’s trial it was revealed that as a child he became in-
terested in Nazi history and beliefs, holding extreme 
far-right views since the age of 14, in which he became 
convinced of a Jewish international conspiracy and the 
UK state was oppressing the white community. As a 
result, Renshaw called for the eradication of Jews, de-
nied the holocaust occurred during World War Two 
and, seeing a race war was inevitable, he advocated at 
public rallies to be prepared to fight that war. 
 
Originally a member of the far-right political party, 
the British National Party, Renshaw moved to join 
National Action that became proscribed as a terrorist 
organisation following the group’s expression of         
support for the murder of the Labour MP Jo Cox in 
June 2016. Renshaw used open-source media prais-
ing Jo Cox’s murder in 2017 when he was planning 
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to replicate Cox’s murder with the murder of Rosie 
Cooper. He saw the MP as committing treason be-
cause she represented the Jewish controlled state op-
pressing the white community and as Rosie Cooper 
represented a ‘false democracy’ she deserved to die. 
While forming the plan, Renshaw openly bragged 
about it to other National Action members, saying 
killing Rosie Cooper was necessary because she was a 
member of the Labour Party and therefore responsi-
ble for mass immigration. Aware that she was an ac-
tive constituency MP, Renshaw planned to kill Rosie 
Cooper at a social event using a machete to hack at 
her jugular. In Renshaw’s planning he saw the MP as 
someone easy to get at and a ‘logistical target’.  
In relation to killing Detective Constable Victoria 
Henderson, the police officer who investigated him 
in an earlier investigation for sexual offences for 
which he was convicted, Renshaw intended to take 
ordinary members of the public hostage in a public 
house and demand the presence of the officer. He 
would then kill her and cause armed police officers 
who would have been called to the scene to shoot 
him.  
In sentencing Renshaw Mrs Justice McGowan con-
sidered the aggravating factors related to section 5. 
In relation to the degree of planning, as Renshaw 
planned to murder a serving member of Parliament, 
it was seen an ‘an attack on democracy’ and therefore 
would have been committed for the purpose of ad-
vancing a political cause. Evidence was also present 
that Renshaw was deeply imbued with the Nazi doc-
trine of the extreme far-right. Mrs Justice McGowan 
also took this, and the following aggravating factors 
related to section 5 into account, Renshaw’s recent 
and repeated possession and access to extremist ma-
terial and his communication with other extremists. 
As a result, Renshaw received a life sentence having to 
serve a minimum of twenty years before being con-
sidered for release.  
How These Cases Can Assist UK Counter-Terrorism 
Investigators 
As emphasised, the aim of counter-terrorism investi-
gations is to prevent terrorist attacks from happen-
ing. In essence section 5 means a person can be 
arrested and convicted for a terrorist attack that has 
not taken place. In criminal law this situation is not 
new. Under section 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 the of-
fence of conspiracy occurs where a person agrees with 
another person to pursue a course of conduct 
amounting to or involve the commission of an offence 
or would amount to an offence but for the existence 
of facts that would render the commission of the of-
fence impossible. Where a person’s actions go beyond 
an agreement, having the intent to commit an offence 
where that person’s action is more than mere 
preparatory and, as seen with conspiracy, if a person 
intends to commit an offence even though the facts 
are such the commission of the offence is impossible, 
they still commit an offence (section 1 Criminal At-
tempts Act 1981). In both statutory offences a person 
can receive a long custodial sentence for an offence 
that never occurred. The aim of these offences to 
allow investigators the power to intervene and pre-
vent an offence from taking place. It is submitted that 
section 5 is a hybrid of both the above offences as the 
offence is committed where a person has the intent 
to commit a terrorist act or engages in conduct in the 
preparation of this offence.  
How cases like Shaikh and Renshaw assists investiga-
tors is in taking cognizance of the aggravating factors 
applied by the trial judges on receiving a guilty plea 
or verdict that can in effect direct them to the type 
and level of evidence required to secure a conviction. 
As seen in both cases, the prosecution evidence re-
vealed how the defendants were deeply imbued with 
an extremist narrative. In building a section 5 prose-
cution case evidence will be required that reveals what 
extremist material they are downloading and looking 
at be it in the form of videos and written form, hard 
copy paraphernalia, possessions linked to extremist 
causes, who they are communicating with and if the 
suspect is posting extremist content in various social 
media platforms (including encrypted sites like What-
sApp or Telegram). One must be careful in deter-
mining if such material is evidence related to section 
5 if that material is extremist material protected 
under the right to freedom of expression. What is im-
portant here is gathering evidence showing a pattern 
of behaviour linked to extremist causes. For example, 
where a suspect is found to be in possession of ex-
treme far-right (neo-Nazi) materials such as swastika 
flags, an SS dagger or a Nazi uniform, downloads ma-
terial linked to proscribed groups like National Ac-
tion or Sonnenkrieg Division and is communicating 
with and posting content on neo-Nazi or white 
supremacist group sites, this would provide a pattern 
of behaviour demonstrating the depth and extent of 
the radicalisation of a suspect. The same would apply 
to a suspect imbued with the Islamist ideology linked 
to groups like Al Qaeda or IS.  
As seen in both the Shaikh and Renshaw cases, the 
planning was more than simply having an idea, both 
defendants were considerably involved in planning 
their respective attacks as they both took active steps 
to carry out those attacks. Shaikh carried out surveil-
lance of St Paul’s Cathedral, including checking the 
security arrangements at the Cathedral. Ascertaining 
that Rosie Cooper attended many constituency 
events, Renshaw planned to attend one of them to 
gain access to the MP and he bought a machete that 
he intended to use to kill her. In order to show the 
degree of planning, complexity and sophistication in-
volved, investigators would be looking for evidence 
not just of action, but the type of action taken and level 
of the suspect’s intent to commit the act, along with 
the amount of time the suspect has taken in relation to 
the planning. This will be important evidence the po-
lice must obtain for the Crown Prosecution Service in 
England and Wales, the Procurator Fiscal in Scotland 
and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ire-
land to decide if there is sufficient evidence to charge 
and a prosecution to succeed.  
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Conclusion 
Especially in relation to terrorist activity we see leg-
islative changes introduced to keep pace with changes 
and developments in terrorists’ tactics and section 5 
Terrorism Act 2006 is a good example of one of those 
changes. When drafting the Terrorism Act 2000 it 
may not have been foreseen how important this of-
fence was, especially in assisting counter-terrorism in-
vestigators in taking positive steps in preventing an 
act of terrorism occurring. As seen, by having a sen-
tence of life imprisonment, this is a serious offence 
and will be treated by the courts the same way as if a 
terrorist act occurred. In addition to the appellate 
court decisions, what is useful in examining the 
courts’ sentencing guidelines for section 5 is how they 
can be transposed from the courtroom to the streets 
in guiding counter-terrorism investigators’ evidence 
gathering, allowing them to make a pre-emptive ar-
rest before a terorist act occurs thereby saving lives 
and preventing persons suffering serious injury. 
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